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Abstract
This book differs from existing works on extraterritorial scholarship by its focus, thoughtful
analysis and scholarly approach, and balanced view of the U.S. stance on extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.
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. Reviewed by Marsha Cope Huie*
There is no scarcity of scholarly writings on the subject of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.' Many of these are discursive law
journal articles either devoted merely to isolated points or ex-
amining the law of only one nation that seeks to assert its laws
outside its own territory.
This book differs from existing works, initially, by its fo-
cus. The authors are learned in the legal systems of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the European Economic
Community, and they knowledgeably examine the case-law in
each jurisdiction. Dr. Stephens is a U.S. attorney schooled in
England and working in London, and Sir Alan Neale is a Brit-
ish career civil servant who has served as Deputy Chairman of
the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1982-1986).
The book differs also by reason of its conciseness: It contains
only 211 pages of text. Also, it differs from some of the other
works in the field in its thoughtful analysis and scholarly ap-
proach to the subject matter. Finally, the authors manage to
present a balanced, though deservedly critical, view of the U.S.
stance on extraterritorial jurisdiction-"the American expan-
sive view of jurisdiction." What they do better than others is
to criticize fairly the controversial effects doctrine advocated by
U.S. jurists. They succeed in reaching their main goal: To
show as a practical matter that the aggressive U.S. view ofjuris-
diction does not work, that "[t]he game is just not worth the
candle" (p. 208). The striking divergence of U.S. and foreign
* Associate Professor, School of Law, St. Mary's University of San Antonio.
1. See, e.g., A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLEC-
TION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983); Maier, Interest Balancing and Extratelr'itorial Jurisdic-
tion, 31 AM. J. COMp. L. 579 (1983); Meessen, AntitrustJniisdiction Under Customar
, 
In-
ternational Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984); Rosenthal,Jurisdictional Conflicts Between
Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487 (1985).
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views about U.S. enforcement of its competition laws cries for
a balanced view in a readable monograph-and this is it.
This book's one shortcoming is the weakness of its pro-
posals for resolution of the problem. With this omission of in-
novation, the authors, adverting to objective territoriality as
the doctrinal basis for jurisdiction, regrettably open them-
selves to the charge that they merely plow earth already well-
tilled. Such criticism, however, must in no way detract from
the keenness of their analysis otherwise. The danger of a com-
pilation of case law is that it may abandon the reader in a quag-
mire of facts or lose the reader in a burdensome forest of cita-
tions. In this well-crafted work, the authors manage to avoid
this danger, having succeeded brilliantly in illuminating the
overall significance of the cases.
The remarkable postwar expansion of multinational cor-
porations has heightened interest in the arcane subject of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. In an earlier era, when a nation's
business activities did not usually extend beyond its borders,
the country's control over those activities also came to a halt at
its borders. More recently, however, in order to control the
actions of multinational corporations, many nations have come
to believe they must assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, an as-
sertion that, unfortunately, has caused serious clashes among
trading nations in a global economy. Gaps and clashes in mu-
nicipal laws enable rich and powerful transnational corpora-
tions to place pertinent documentation outside the grasp of
the forum court. The United States's forty-year dominance in
the world economy has been partially eclipsed by Japan and
other nations of the Pacific Rim. The United States is no
longer in a position to dictate economic policy to foreign na-
tions or to apply, at will, U.S. competition rules to foreign cor-
porations operating outside the United States. Recent years
have seen an escalation of international tensions caused by
U.S. courts' assertion of jurisdiction over activities that, while
formulated and conducted entirely abroad, have economic im-
pact within the United States. U.S. antitrust policy is, of
course, the most fecund source of case-law on extraterritorial-
ity.
Nationality and territoriality as bases for jurisdiction
under international law are not in dispute. As ChiefJustice Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes reiterated in Amenican Banana Co. v. United
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Fruit Co., " '[a]ll legislation is primafacie territorial.' "2 His ob-
servation was cited just last year by Advocate General Darmon
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the
"Court of Justice") in the much-awaited A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6"
v. Commission (Wood Pulp) decision.' Territoriality as a basis for
jurisdiction may be further divided into subjective territoriality
(a state has jurisdiction over acts begun within the territory but
completed elsewhere) and objective territoriality (the con-
verse: A state has jurisdiction over acts begun elsewhere but
completed within the territory).4 Also, there is the territorial
effects theory of jurisdiction.
Under the controversial territorial effects theory of juris-
diction, which has been criticized by academicians, 5 business
2. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (quoting Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528
(1879)).
3. Case 89/85, 1988 E.C.R. ,Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,619
(opinion of Advocate General Darmon). At first blush, the Commission seems to
have adopted the effects doctrine, but according to Neale and Stephens, the Commis-
sion's wording has nothing in common with Judge Hand's effects doctrine, because
the concerns were "doing business" within the Community (p. 186 n.21).
4. See Higgins, The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF LAWS & RESPONSES THERETO 3, 5-7 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984).
5. See Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at..., 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at
18,617; see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept.
7). Neale & Stephens state that
[t]he mainstream view in the United States .. .is that the 'effects doctrine'
derives from the 'objective' territorial principle ....
On this issue the critic outside the United States cannot fail to be struck
by the narrow base of support for the 'effects doctrine,' both historically and
in terms of legal precedent. Although the 'objective' territorial principle
had been known and applied by both English and American courts for at
least a century in other branches of law, it had never been invoked in anti-
trust cases prior to ALCOA (p. 167).
They remark, however, that the 1985 and 1986 drafts of the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) adopt the "effects doc-
trine" (p. 166). For an interesting U.S. commentary on the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States (the "Restatement"), adopted after this book went
to press, see Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the NVew Restatement: Is "Reasonableness"
the Answer?, 19 INT'L LAW & POL. 565 (1987). The Restatement states that "[a] state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to .. .conduct outside its territory which
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1988) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. The authors equate the Restatement's "intent" language with a
requirement of "foreseeability" (p. 167). Neale and Stephens offer a terse footnote
regarding the Restatement: "There is a tendency for US courts to quote the Restatement
as accepted authority on international law. It is important to remember, however,
that it states an American view that is not necessarily accepted elsewhere" (p. 166
n.l).
592 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:589
practices effectuated entirely within state A will subject the ac-
tors to the jurisdiction of courts in state B, as long as foresee-
able and substantial effects result in state B. U.S. courts have
long incurred the resentment of the country's trading partners
by asserting the territorial effects theory to support U.S. anti-
trust laws. The authors take the position that it is wrong and
ultimately not cost-beneficial for one country to assert jurisdic-
tion over acts in another country that merely have effects
within the country asserting jurisdiction (p. 46).
The high-water mark of U.S. extraterritoriality was struck
in 1945 by Judge Learned Hand's adoption of the controver-
sial effects doctrine in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(ALCOA). 6 Dispensing with the need for examination of gener-
ally accepted principles of international law, the judge arro-
gated unto his court the power to enforce the Sherman Act
over non-nationals for their conduct abroad that, while occur-
ring entirely outside the borders of the United States, has, in
the time-worn and oft-quoted language, "consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends. ' 7
In ALCOA, Judge Hand cited as precedent three cases8
that allowed him to make what the authors call a "leap of faith"
from customary principles of international law to the effects
doctrine (p. 45). Distinguishing the first two authorities as
purely domestic cases and the third as involving some acts ac-
tually occurring within (and not merely effects upon) the
United States, the authors conclude that the foundation for the
"6. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. Id. at 444. Of interest is Advocate General Darmon's discussion of ALCOA in
the recent landmark Wood Pulp case. See Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at -, 33-35,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,619-20. Also, the West German Federal
Court ofJustice is generally thought to have embraced the effects doctrine, by having
held German competition law applicable where the effect within the territory is "suffi-
cient." Our authors, however, interpret the German language "sich auswirken" as
adopting the objective territorial principle, in that some business conducted must
"sich auswirken" within Germany, literally "work themselves out' within the territory
(p. 186 n.21). The United Kingdom vigorously rejects the effects doctrine. See, e.g.,
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1954] 3 All E.R. 88, 91; lWood
Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at , Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,605 (United King-
dom, intervenor, maintained that court could find jurisdiction in casu only under ef-
fects doctrine, which has been accepted under neither public international law nor
decision of Court ofJustice).
8. ALCOA 148 F.2d at 443 (citing Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927);
Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280
(1911)).
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effects doctrine is fragile at best, having been forged in the
most part, ironically, from precedent delineating federal juris-
diction in interstate matters and unconcerned with cases hav-
ing true transnational contacts. Perhaps it should be noted
that most U.S. cases have concerned actual activity conducted
within the United States and not merely the "effects" of such
activity felt within the country;9 U.S. courts have only rarely
asserted extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction under the effects
doctrine.'" The mere threat of their doing so has caused re--
sentment to fester against their "economic imperialism." Ill-
feeling has occasionally spilled over in the form of blocking
and clawback statutes such as those the United Kingdom has
enacted."
Under Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 12 and subse-
quent U.S. cases, two claims are made (p. 175). First, that
there must be "direct, substantial, and foreseeable" effects in
order to ground jurisdiction. Secondly, the courts must em-
9. See Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust,
Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350 (1983) (discussing cases that have applied the,"ef-
fects" test in various forms).
10. On this issue Neale and Stephens state:
It is sometimes argued that if the number of cases needing the 'effects doc-
trine' is small, foreign interests do not have too much to worry about. But,
of course, the situation is not symmetrical; the individual case which is small
in relation to the US economy may be of catastrophic importance to the
defendant. Additionally, although the number of reported cases . . . is
small, the number of actual complaints relying on the doctrine has been
much higher. Moreover, more complaints are made than reach the courts
(p. 186 n.22).
On this point there seems to be a lack of documentation. This criticism is tempered,
however, by the indictment presented by Mr. Phillip Allott, Trinity College, Cam-
bridge, of the "American macho academic style .. . which is an unworthy heir to the
style of the High Renaissance of German university culture in the nineteenth century,
itself a radical departure from the characteristically more lyrical style of French, Ital-
ian or British culture and of German culture before and since." Allott, .llaking Sense
of the Law (I), 108 CAMBRIDGE REV. 65, 68 (1987).
11. For discussions of various blocking statutes, see Atwood, Blocking Statutes and
Sovereign Compulsion: Recent Developments and the Proposed Restatement, in 1985 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 327 (B. Hawk ed. 1986); Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block
American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN.J. INT'L L. 247 (1982); Note, Reassessment of Interna-
tional Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Statutes, Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages,
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1987). These blocking statutes fall generally into
two types: those avoiding the enforcement of foreign judgments and those blocking
foreign discovery proceedings. The British statute clearly targets U.S. incursions.
See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
12. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ploy a balancing test of the foreign state's interests against the
interests of the United States to ensure that assertion ofjuris-
diction is not unreasonable (p. 175). Professor Eleanor Fox is
one of the most highly respected U.S. scholars who views the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(the "Restatement") and the jurisdictional balancing of interests
as "reasonable and moderate."' 3 The authors, however, disa-
gree (pp. 176-77).
Implicit in the Restatement and the Timberlane line of case
law is that courts will use their discretion to abstain from exer-
cising jurisdiction. But "the cases tell a different and more
complex story" (p. 177), one that has often forced foreign de-
fendants to appear before U.S. courts so that the balancing ex-
ercise offers a defense "rather than a genuine prospect of
avoiding the burden of accepting US jurisdiction" (p. 178). In
their examination of the case law, Neale and Stephens find
only one possible exception to a U.S. court's assuming jurisdic-
tion after a Timberlane-type interest analysis. 4 Nor are they
sanguine that legislation can relieve the excessive assumption
of jurisdiction in U.S. courts, as they view the balancing test,
whether legislatively defined or not, as "perverse and impracti-
cal" (p. 179). In a disappointingly terse six pages they seek a
solution and propose, in chapter 10, a rule of jurisdiction
under the rubric, "Is there a Better Answer?" (pp. 181-87).
They retreat to a somewhat simplistic test: Was there purpo-
sive activity actually found within the state asserting jurisdic-
tion? On this sole point, they may be fairly criticized for hav-
ing adopted a mechanical solution to a seemingly intractable
problem of law.
And what is the authors' view of the practical effect of the
Timberlane/Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp.'5 jurisdictional
rule-of-reason test, believed by most in the United States to
represent a retreat from the aggressive stance of ALCOA?
Why, the U.S. interests, thrown in for the U.S. court's consid-
eration on an ad hoc basis, almost always ground extraterrito-
13. Fox, supra note 5, at 601; see also, RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 403.
14. See O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d
449 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988).
15. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The court in Mannington built upon
Timberlane, "adding new factors to the balancing test which could be relevant to cases
involving foreign defendants" (p. 73).
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rial jurisdiction, of course. Whether the court fails to proceed
for reasons of comity raises another question. U.S. courts, in
using their post-Timberlane interest-analysis/comity approach
to determine whether to assert jurisdiction over foreign busi-
ness transactions occurring outside but having effects within
the United States, come off as not really operating under a rule
of law. They are seen rather as employing an unprincipled as-
sertion-of-interest method under the guise of a jurisdictional
rule of reason.' 6 The authors' suggestion: "If we want a rule
of law, we should opt for principles of jurisdiction which tell
us, over the widest possible range of practical situations, where
we stand and to whom we are answerable" (p. 210).
The authors seek to revert to the primacy of the objective
territorial principle of jurisdiction based on mutual respect of
sovereigns. They do this in such a manner that this principle
would be altered so that the notion of "taking effect" necessar-
ily involves "some real happening" within the jurisdiction
"and not just that actions complete in themselves in one coun-
try may have repercussions in another" (p. 209). Given one
sovereign's wish for comity, that is, to achieve accord with an-
other sovereign, this position will not result in "monolithic re-
jection of all other claims to jurisdiction" (p. 209). Anyway,
claims asserted extraterritorially after the interest-balancing
process are bound to offend. "The withdrawal of such claims
offers the best hope of securing it" (p. 209). One must wonder
if this is a utopian view, yet, confronted by the existence of
retaliatory blocking and clawback legislation, one must take the
point.
The authors would draw a sharp distinction between some
real happening in the forum, such as doing business, and ac-
tions taken entirely elsewhere having repercussions within the
state asserting jurisdiction. More than evidence of effects is re-
quired; the finder of fact must have found that, "in a meaning-
ful sense," business has been conducted within the jurisdic-
tion. Foreseeing a return to the objective territorial principle,
which Neale and Stephens regard as "essentially correct," they
16. In regard to United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center,
Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1965), the authors pose a
rhetorical question: "[W]hether an American court would uphold a Swiss court or-
der requiring a branch of a Swiss bank incorporated in New York to keep secret
records to which a New York litigant sought access .... " (pp. 193-94).
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"simply do not believe that this distinction once grasped is
either easy for commentators to gainsay or difficult for courts
to apply" (pp. 208-10). In actual fact, however, the line be-
tween (a) purposive activity within the state asserting jurisdic-
tion and (b) mere effects therein may be ill-defined. The posi-
tion of the United Kingdom in Wood Pulp, showing that reason-
able minds can differ, reveals this flaw in this book. The
United Kingdom argued that the Court of Justice could assert
jurisdiction over the defendants' anticompetitive activities only
by adopting an effects doctrine.
In Wood Pulp, the Court of Justice, whose members would
have first read or heard the Advocate General's opinion, which
cites this book, 7 adopted a view of an objective territorial
principle. The Court of Justice made no finding as to whether
the effects doctrine is incompatible with either Community or
public international law, but found, rather, that the conduct
occurring outside the Community proscribed by Article 8518
(price-fixing) was implemented inside the Community. Part of
the proscribed activity had occurred within the EEC. The
court was able to find jurisdiction under the (objective) territo-
riality principle universally recognized in international law.' 9
It would have been fruitful to have the authors' insight on the
much-awaited Wood Pulp decision, but our book went to press
while the, court was still holding this political hot potato. Since
factual evidence of "purposive activity" within the Community
would, in their view, ground jurisdiction under the "objective"
territorial principle, one assumes that Messrs. Neale and Ste-
phens would not have disagreed with the decision of the Court
of Jtstice.
The authors' view of unitary jurisdiction over the various
members of a multicorporate enterprise mirrors'their general
refusal to adopt mechanical solutions to seemingly intractable
problems of law. In attaining jurisdiction over, an arm of a
multinational corporation, they reject .the simplistic application
17. A. Ahtstr6m Osakeyhti6 v. Commission (Wood Pulp), Case 89/85, 1988
E.C.R. - n.34, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,619 n.34.
18. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,,1957, art.
85(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) at 32 (official English Version), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (1958) (unofficial English trans.).
19. See ll'00d Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491,at
18,612.
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of a simple economic unit ("SEU") test. An " 'economic en-
tity' " approach, it is argued, would wrongly allow a court, hav-
ing jurisdiction over one unit of the multicorporate enterprise,
to ground jurisdiction over the entire enterprise (p. 210).
Such a view is of particular interest in the United States. In
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,20 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary com-
prise an SEU. This U.S. case was cited by the authors, under-
standably not in this context, because the issue of unitary juris-
diction was in fact not before the Court. Nonetheless, it seems
that Copperweld, taken to its logical conclusion, compels a uni-
tary view ofjurisdiction.2 ' Instead, the authors would revert to
agency principles where the subsidiary within the territory is
"unable to respond to the host state's requirements of law and
policy without reference to the parent company" (p. 210). In
other cases, "jurisdictional problems are greatly simplified,
and in most circumstances enforcement is no less effective, if
jurisdiction is asserted in the first place over-the company in-
corporated and operating within the state" (p. 210). Their re-
jection of a simplistic, mechanical -SEU test is to be applauded.
Returning to the strict extraterritoriality issue, the authors
discern differing U.S. views in the post-ALCOA case law. First,
"[s]ome US officials no longer accept that any positive princi-
ple of jurisdiction is needed at all, "basing their claim on the
'wide. measure of discretion' afforded by the Lotus case" (p.
167). It follows "that international affairs typically give rise to
concurrent or conflicting claims to jurisdiction" (p. 167). Sec-
ond, the authors discern the "mainstream view," i.e., that the
effects doctrine derives from the objective territorial principle
of international law. Their main criticism of the objective terri-
torial principle, as interpreted thus, is that jurisdiction must
require some greater impact on the state than just the effects of
action taken elsewhere (p. 168). For example, in the instance
of price-concertation occurring entirely abroad, Neale and Ste-
phens, find no nexus satisfactory, of. this principle between a
,20.467 U.S: 752 (1984).
21. See id. In the Community, the Court ofJustice seems to have taken a con-
trary yiew, rejecting the enterprise entity theory insofar as it negates the possibility of
intra-enterprise conspiracy under the competition laws. See Bodson v. Pompes
Fun~br'e s (Funeral Parlors), Case 30/87, 1988 E.C.R. - (May 4, 1988) (full text avail-
able in French on LEXIS, Intnat library, CJCE file).
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foreign restrictive agreement taken abroad and a U.S. con-
sumer's voluntarily purchasing the product whose price has
been subject to foreign price-concertation: Granted,
the idea that the willing buyer may himself produce the ef-
fects which make the overseas action criminal may not seem
so paradoxical in the United States as it does outside. But it
is difficult to believe that public opinion in the United States
would be content for other countries to extend their juris-
diction against American interests in this way. (p. 169).
To illustrate further the undesirability of the effects doc-
trine, the authors postulate a boycott taken abroad with the
purpose of interdicting the supply of certain goods into the
United States. Despite the existence of obvious foreseeable
and substantial effects, and violation of the Sherman Act, the
problem would call for diplomatic rather than legal action.
Thus, "[o]utside the United States it also seems to many ob-
servers that if, the 'effects doctrine' cannot practicably be in-
voked when goods are not supplied at all from another coun-
try, it is anomalous to invoke it against lawful decisions in
other states regarding the terms and conditions of supply" (p.
170).
Another anomaly of the effects doctrine is revealed when
the sovereign compulsion defense is asserted (p. 170). For ex-
ample, in the case of United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, Inc. (Swiss Watchmakers),22 if the defendants'
activities had been required, a U.S. court asserting extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction could not have proceeded. It is of interest that
certain U.S. defendants in Wood Pulp asserted the Webb-
Pomerene Act,23 which grants immunity from U.S. antitrust
laws to certain U.S. export cartels, as a defense to suit in the
Community. 24 After our book went to press, the Court ofJus-
tice made short shrift of this argument, for Webb-Pomerene
allowed, but did not compel, their actions under U.S. law. 21
Concerning the sovereign defense/foreign compulsion
doctrine, it is the authors' view that
22. 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1965).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).
24. A. Ahistr6m Osakeyhti6 v. Commission (Wood Pulp), Case 89/85, 1988
E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,599.
25. See id. at -_, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,604.
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in general, foreign governments are puzzled rather than
gratified by the suggestion that they may protect their busi-
ness men by mandating their conduct. Even when their
own competition law does not bar some restrictive practice,
they will not necessarily want to give it a stamp of official
approval. They find it strange, in any event, to be put in the
position of licensing their companies to break another
country's laws. (p. 172).
Furthermore, foreigners should be wary of availing themselves
of the foreign compulsion defense in U.S. courts, for
"[w]hatever discretion the Department of Justice may exercise,
private litigants will not necessarily be deterred from starting
treble damage actions with all their attendant expense and un-
certainty" (p. 173). This is true, though of course the defense
assertable against the government as plaintiff is similarly al-
lowed against a private plaintiff's complaint. There it is again,
nonetheless, the foreign revulsion from our domestic competi-
tion laws as applied to them.
In the final chapter, the authors address jurisdictional
claims for disclosure and enforcement. As to the former, for-
eigners have long viewed the wide-ranging scope of U.S. dis-
covery with both alarm and resentment. Such efforts "to bull-
doze aside the inconvenient claims of the territorial sovereign"
are "defective as law and inept as strategy" (pp. 194-95). It is
perhaps unfortunate that the book went to press in mid-1988,
on the eve of publication of the U.S. Department of Justice's
long-awaited Antitrust Guidelines for International Opera-
tions, 26 successor to the 1977 edition. 27 The new Guide has a
definite "Chicago" or Efficiency School flavor, and the au-
thors' comments would have been welcome.
The authors' insights are often delightfully fresh. For ex-
ample, it is noted that Americans recoil from physical imperial-
ism while practicing the same with their law. This aggressive
U.S. stance is attributed in part to the litigious nature of U.S.
society, the roots of which are revealed in an enthusiasm for an
excess of democracy and a reverence for the rule of law.
(Americans of course, unlike the British, have a written Consti-
26. Department ofJustice Guidelines, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 24 (extra ed.
Nov. 10, 1988).
27. Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,110 (Jan. 26, 1977).
19891 599
600 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 12:589
tution enshrining the rule of law.) The U.S. obeisance to legal
process leads directly to a litigious nature, the conviction that
every wrong has a remedy in a court of law, that "whatever is
disapproved, politically or morally, must surely be actionable
in some appropriate forum" (p. 207).
Thus, having begun with the source of the international
controversy, the authors provide a concise yet comprehensive
and thoughtful exposition of the problem. Their title is apt,
for increasingly commerce is international and admitting of
ever-fewer border impediments. Witness the. approach of
1992 with the EEC's goal of a single, unified market. Yet, ju-
risdiction is territorial, confined by national boundaries. And
therein lies ,the rub.
There being no supranational body capable of resolving
extraterritorial conflict, save by consent of the affected sover-
eigns,"8 the broader question is, of course, whether. existing
legal systems are adequate to cope with the demands of trans-
national business enterprises representing vast aggregations of
capital. In the opinion of this reviewer, they are not.. Interna-
tional commerce has outgrown the traditional notions ofjuris-
diction based on territoriality. And, the traditional primacy of
territoriality as a basis for jurisdiction having been challenged,
the best hope for avoiding international tensions is a series of
international treaties, alongside reformation of municipal com-
petition laws, to conform to the exigencies of transnational
business and the demands of international comity.29 Another
28. Advocate General Darmon in Wood Pulp writes that the effects doctrine por-
tion of the Lotus decision "has admittedly been criticized by academic writers but has
not so far been contradicted in international case law, [which] permits the conclusion
to be drawn that consideration of the location of the effects as the basis of a State's
jurisdiction is in conformity with the rules of international law." flood Pulp, 1988
E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491, at 18,618. The Advocate General
cites Paul Demaret as being in accord. Id.; see Demaret, L'Extroterritorialit des Lois et
les Relations Transatlantiques: Une Question de Droit ou de Diplomatie? 1985 CAHIERS DE
DROIT EUROPtEN 1, 26.
29. Admittedly, there has been little success in rewriting our domestic antitrust
laws. Efforts to remove the treble damages provision have thus far failed in Con-
gress. Particular irritants to foreigners are, of course, allowing private parties stand-
ing as plaintiffs, the incentive to suit given to those private litigants by the treble
damages provision, the punitive nature of those same treble damages. and the expan-
sive and intrusive scope of our discovery procedures. There have been some
changes-some bilateral treaties and two pertinent statutes ineffective to ease inter-
national friction over extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. In fact, they
are insulting to importers, because they are beneficial to U.S. exporters. See, for
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view not cited by the authors, but of interest for its startling
character, is that of Professors Dunfee and Friedman, who wish
ultimate change but advocate in the interim a laissez-faire ap-
proach until the point of such chaos that various sovereigns
will gladly surrender some of their sovereignty to rule under
mutual accords.S°
The authors, however, agree with neither of these views.
Instead, they gracefully and persuasively advocate an applica-
tion of the objective principle of territorial jurisdiction, one
which is already accepted as customary international law (p.
184) and is to be preferred over the Timberlane "jurisdictional
rule of reason" (the late Kingman Brewster's phrase), which is
the same as the interest-balancing/comity approach: "[S]uch a
change would in our view have many practical advantages over
seeking an ex post mitigation. of the 'effects doctrine' through a
balancing process" (p. 184). The authors are of course correct
in saying that each state is sovereign in prescribing and enforc-
ing laws within its territory save by consent to derogation of its
sovereignty (p. 208). Hence, a topic for inclusion for which a
reviewer can make out a case is how, in what ways, and under
what circumstances the sovereign may, and should wish, so to
agree.
The authors' solution may belie the complexity of the
problem. This reviewer does not suggest that the problems
inherent in extraterritorial jurisdiction can be solved in one
thin text. An articulation, however, of novel proposals for a
better scheme of things would have been appreciated. Perhaps
the authors should be lauded for trying to deal with the prob-
lem within established principles of international law. In es-
example, the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4011-
4021 (1982), which does not deal with the reach of U.S. antitrust laws (voluntary
applicant for export certificate of a review must show that export activity will produce
"neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of trade within the United
States nor a substantial restraint of the export trade of any competitor of the appli-
cant .: ." 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1)) and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1982) (Sherman Act coverage over import
trade not limited). Some will find cause for optimism in the long-awaited successor
to the 1977 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, the new version hav-
ing been published in mid-1988 by the U.S. Department of Justice. See supra notes
27-28. But the problem persists of the private plaintiff, who ill-understands matters
of international comity.
30. Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-Territonial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws. A Proposal for an Inteoim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1984).
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sence they advocate a purely national approach: Each nation's
courts will adopt the objective territorial principle as a re-
straint on the exercise ofjurisdiction. The authors' view of a
better scheme assumes a judicial disinclination to expansive
views ofjurisdiction. It may occur in practice, though, that few
judges like to decline jurisdiction when counsel argues that
none exists. Furthermore, while concededly the objective ter-
ritorial principle, with correct judicial adherence, would pro-
vide stability and precedential certainty, it is somewhat disap-
pointing to be told that the court, before assuming jurisdic-
tion, must have found that "in a meaningful sense" the
proscribed activity has been conducted within the jurisdiction.
Such a finding seems subject to judicial manipulation. Courts,
on an ad hoc basis, while straining to ground jurisdiction,
might transmogrify the objective territorial principle into the
effects doctrine, too readily finding meaningful activity within
their jurisdictions.
Finally, given the Sherman Act in the United States, the
problem persists, for example, of the private plaintiff who is ill-
equipped to understand matters of international comity.
Surely this plaintiff's indisposition to shape the private lawsuit
to the imperatives of foreign policy points to the need for pro-
posals for reforming municipal competition laws.
In that vein, the substantive municipal competition laws of
the industrialized world may overlap, leave omissions of cover-
age, or clash and irritate. Hence the desirability of the authors'
postulating a uniform competition law code to be adopted by
sovereign states. Such a code is not beyond the realm of possi-
bility, at least in the U.S. and EEC, because of similarities in
their antitrust laws. In patterning the Community's competi-
tion laws after those of the U.S., the EEC has already adopted
the best and rejected the worst features of U.S. antitrust law. A
revision of the U.S. antitrust laws, proposed often but unsuc-
cessfully so far, is needed to resolve a great deal of domestic
confusion as well.
The way to resolve most of the problems among trading
partners is joint adoption of the same set of substantive com-
petition laws. The need for the effects doctrine would thereby
disappear. Even so, the problem of differing interpretations
would emerge, state A having a different perspective from state
B. Hence, it would become necessary for, if not a suprana-
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tional enforcement body, then at least a standing body of rep-
resentatives from each country to meet periodically towards
resolution of interpretive difficulties.
In sum, U.S., British, and EEC students and practitioners
alike, as well as policy-makers in each of the jurisdictions, will
undoubtedly find much of interest in this slim volume. En-
tirely readable, this is the one book for those with no prior
experience in the subject, because it conducts a thoughtful od-
yssey through the case law. At the same time it is recom-
mended for those already acquainted with the case law, for the
perspective is broad and the analysis keen. The quality of this
work is high. There is much to praise (meticulously
researched, clear and elegant prose) and little to criticize (per-
haps an entire chapter devoted solely to "Our Resolution of
the Problem" instead of "weigh[ing] up the state of the argu-
ment" in the last two chapters (p. 165), with the aim of finding
"the balance of advantage between the benefits and cost of var-
ious types of claim to jurisdiction" (p. 166)).31 But this may be
a niggling criticism of format-and this is an admirable work,
nonetheless.
31. The book is divided into three parts entitled "Introduction to the Problem
and the Relevant Law," "Case-law on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction," and "The State
of the Argument." In chapter 10, in regard to jurisdiction, the authors ask: "Is there
a Better Answer?" (pp. 181-87); in chapter 11, in respect of discovery, they include:
"Better Options-Disclosure" (pp. 194-200) and "Better Options-Enforcement"
(pp. 200-05).
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